In the leading case of Judson v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co. of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 74-75 (1954), appeal after remand 25 N.J. 17 the Court described the general purposes and application of our summary judgment rule, now R. 4:46-2:

It is designated to provide a prompt, businesslike and inexpensive method of disposing of any cause which a discriminating search of the merits in the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits submitted on the motion clearly shows not to present any genuine issue of material fact requiring disposition at a trial. Shientag, 4 Ford. L. Rev. 186 (1935). In conjunction with the pretrial discovery and pretrial conference procedures, the summary judgment procedure aims at ‘the swift uncovering of the merits and either their effective disposition or their advancement toward prompt resolution of trial.’

Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 567, 579 (1952).

[I]f the opposing party offers no affidavits or matter in opposition, or only facts which are immaterial or of an insubstantial nature, a mere scintilla, 5 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 607, 613 (1952), ‘fanciful, frivolous, gauzy or merely suspicious,’ 6 Moore Federal Practice, par. 56:13(3), he will not be heard to complain if the court grants summary judgment, taking as true the statement of uncontradicted facts in the papers relief upon by the moving party, such papers themselves not otherwise showing the existence of an issue of material fact. Taub v. Taub, 9 N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 1950); Lauchert v. American S.S. Co., 65 F.Supp.703, 707 (D.C.W.D.N.Y. 1946). Nor is summary judgment to be denied if other papers pertinent to the motion show palpably the absence of any issue of material fact, although the allegations of the pleadings, standing alone, may raise such an issue. Summary judgment procedure pierces the allegations of the pleadings to show that the facts are otherwise than as alleged.

Wade v. Six Park View Corp., 27 N.J. Super. 469 (App. Div. 1953).

The Court in Judson, quoting from Clark, The Summary Judgment, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 567, 579 (1952), further stated:

What is needed is the application of common sense, good judgment, and decisive action, on the one hand, not to shut a deserving litigant from his trial and, on the other, not to allow harassment of an equally deserving suitor for immediate relief by a long and worthless trial.

[17 N.J. 67, 77 (1954)].

Other cases and like terms are legion. See e.g., The New Jersey Sports and Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457 (Law Div. 1971), affirmed 61 N.J. 1 (1972); Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 35 N.J. 343 (1961); Devlin v. Surgent, 18 N.J. 148 (1955); and Western World Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 481 (App. Div. 1977).

Despite the fact that summary judgment should be granted only with caution, this caution should not result in the failure to utilize the procedure when the movant is justly entitled to this remedy. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Auth. v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. at 469.

In Brill v. The Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520 (1995), the Supreme Court promulgated a new standard, derived from recent United States Supreme Court holdings, under which the reach of the principles in Judson is broadened:

[A] determination of whether there exists a "genuine issue" of material fact that precludes summary judgment requires the motion judge to consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party. [Id. at 540].

Additionally, the Court in Brill reaffirmed its commitment to the efficient and appropriate use of the summary judgment process:

The thrust of today's decision is to encourage trial courts not to refrain from granting summary judgment when the proper circumstances present themselves. Some have suggested that trial courts out of fear of reversal, or out of an overly restrictive reading of Judson, supra, 17 N.J. at 67, or a combination thereof, allow cases to survive summary judgment so long as there is any disputed issue of fact. As to fear of reversal, we believe our judges are made of sterner stuff and have sought conscientiously over the years to follow the law. We may have permitted an encrustation of the Judson standard that obscured its essential import. A summary judgment motion has in the past required and will in the future continue to require a searching review. Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 101 N.J. 161, 167 (1985) (noting that Judson requires a "discriminating search" of the record to determine whether there exists a "genuine issue of material fact requiring disposition at trial"). [Id. at 541].

Here at Verp & Leddy our goal is to use the facts of your case to litigate aggressively in the hope that we can tee your case up for a motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. If such a motion gets granted, the only issue left for trial is not IF you will get money, but rather how much money you will get!